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The Rape Corroboration Requirement:
Repeal Not Reform
Yielding to sustained criticism from feminists1 and prosecutors,2
New York State recently adopted legislation modifying the require-
ment that the testimony of a rape victim must be supported by ad-
ditional evidence to sustain a conviction. 3 Critics had attacked this
so-called corroboration requirement 4 as imposing a sexually discrim-
inatory rule which severely inhibited convictions for the offense of
rape.5 Although these groups had pressed for complete repeal of the
requirement, the new measure was a compromise which retained sig-
nificant portions of the old corroboration rule.0
The retention of a modified rule in New York, and the recent
adoption of similar statutes by other statesT are signs of the continu-
ing vitality of the corroboration requirement. In these jurisdictions,
the word of a rape victim must be supplemented by the testimony of
other witnesses or by circumstantial evidence to sustain -the prosecu-
tion's case. In these same jurisdictions, and throughout the country,
the word of the victim of a robbery, assault, or any other crime may
alone constitute sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.
Criticism and discussion of the corroboration rule have been common
both in the popular and legal press." None of these articles, however,
1. See, e.g., Lear, Q. If You Rape a Woman and Steal Her Ti, What Can They Get
You for in New York.? A. Stealing Her TV, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1972, § 6 (Magazine),
at lh
2. See, e.g., Ludwig, The Case for Repeal of the Sex Corroboration Requirement
in New York, 36 BROOKLYN L. REv. 378 (1970).
3. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1972, at 39, col. 2.
4. Corroboration of rape may be defined as evidence which adds greater credence
to the victim's own testimony regarding the criminal act. Although the statutory language
varies from state to state, the crime of forcible rape is generally defined as the sexual
penetration by a male of a female, not his wife, without her consent. See, e.g., MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The elements of the offense, then,
are penetration, force (or absence of consent), and identity of the accused. The crime
of child rape (or so-called statutory rape) is defined similarly except that force is not
an element. See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. CODE §§ 130.25, 130.30, 130.35(3) (McKinney 1967).
5. See note 38 infra.
6. Burton B. Roberts, president of the New York state District Attorne)s Association.
which had pushed for reform of the corroboration law, described the new act as a
compromise between the earlier law, said to be the strictest in the country, and total
abolition. 167 N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1972, at I, col. 3. See p. 1368 infra for comparison
of the new law with its predecessor.
7. See p. 1372 and note 52 infra.
8. See, e.g., notes 1-2 supra; Younger, The Requirement of Corroboration in Prose.
cutions for Sex Offenses in New York, 40 ForpDHA.t L. REv. 263 (1971); Note, Corroborating
Charges of Rape, 67 CoLu.mt L. REv. 1137 (1967).
Some women have gone beyond recommending repeal of the corroboration require-
ment to advocate redefinition of the crime of rape itself. Arguing that rape and other
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has dealt at any length with the justifications for the corroboration
requirement-factors that are thought to make a rape charge different
enough from an ordinary criminal case to warrant a special rule of
evidence.
This Note will argue that such factors do not justify the corrobora-
tion rule, or other categorical rules of evidence establishing special
requirements for rape prosecutions. It will suggest that the credibility
of testimony from rape victims be left to juries, subject to the dis-
cretion of trial judges to intervene through directed verdicts or com-
ments on the evidence. The Note will first summarize the history of
the rule and its prevalence, substance, and effect in American juris-
dictions. Second, it will systematically examine the premises which
are considered justifications for the corroboration rule. Third, it will
evaluate the need for the corroboration requirement in view of the
traditional legal safeguards against false convictions. Fourth, it will
critique possible alternatives to and modifications of the corrobora-
tion rule.
I. The Corroboration Requirement-Its History, Substance
and Effect
A. History and Prevalence
Statements in the case law to the contrary,9 Wigmore's research has
made it clear that the corroboration requirement for charges of rape
did not exist in the common law.10 The common law made but one
exception to the doctrine that the evidence of one witness may sustain
a conviction, namely, the rule that the testimony of one witness, without
corroborating circumstances, is insufficient to sustain a conviction for
perjury' In prosecutions for rape and, in fact, for all sexual offenses
committed upon women, the common law did not require corrobo-
ration.' 2
sexual offenses are enshrouded in sexual myths, they contend that these crimes should
be recognized for what they are: aggravated physical assaults. Forcible rape, for ex-
ample, would be defined as sexual intercourse without the consent of one of tile parties
and made, under New York law, an assault in the first degree, comparable to causing
serious physical injury by means of a deadly weapon. See Letter to the Editor from
Clinical Program in Women's Rights, N.Y.U. School of Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1972,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 26.
9. See, e.g., People v. Friedman, 139 App. Div. 795, 796, 124 N.Y.S. 521, 522 (2d
Dep't 1910).
10. See 7 J. WIGMOR, EVIDENCE § 2061, at 342 (3d ed. 1940).
11. Id. § 2040(a), at 273. The rule requiring two witnesses to prove a charge of treason
was not a common-law rule. Its beginnings may be traced to English statutes of the
1500's. Id. § 2036(a), at 263.
12. Id. § 2061, at 342.
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Nonetheless, seven jurisdictions have adopted the rule-five by
statute13 and two by judicial decision' 4-that the testimony of a female
complainant must be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction
for rape.'5 On the other hand, thirty-five states have no such require-
ment,16 and eight have taken an intermediate position, requiring only
13. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (rev. ed. 1971); IDAno PEN. AND COan. CODE § 18-907(4)
(Supp. 1971); IowA CODE ANN. § 782.4 (1950); Law of May 22, 1972, ch. 373. § 1, N.Y.
Sess. Law News 195th Sess., June 10, 1972, at 811. V.I. CoDE A.%,.. tit. 14, § 1706 (1964).
14. Only two jurisdictions, the District of Columbia and Nebraska, appear to apply
a full corroboration requirement in the absence of legislation. See p. 1369 infra.
15. The historical bases of the statutory and case law rules vary among American
jurisdictions imposing a corroboration requirement. New York's statutory rule may
be traced back as far as 1886, Law of June 15, 1886, ch. 663 § 1 [1886], N.Y. Laws 169th
Sess. 953, and it has its roots in earlier statutes requiring corroboration of the female's
testimony in charges of seduction under promise of marriage. See, e.g., Law of Mar. 22.
1848, ch. 111, § 1 [1848] N.Y. Laws 71st Sess. 148. Georgia's earlier common.law rule,
the precursor of its present statutory rule, see note 13 supra, appears to have been
adopted in the mistaken belief that it had been the prevailing rule in England. See
Davis v. State, 120 Ga. 433, 435, 48 S.E. 180, 181 (1904). In other states the imposition
of the requirement may be linked to the reversal of the common.law rule e.cluding
parties to a lawsuit from testifying. See, e.g., Mathews v. State, 19 Neb. 330, 337, 27
N.1. 234, 237 (1886). Following this reversal, the courts could hear the defendant ex-
pressly deny the allegations of the complainant. At this time they adopted the rule that
an accusation must be corroborated where the defendant denies the accusation of the
complaining witness in a charge of rape. In still other states the requirement de-
veloped from the application to rape cases of the requirement that an) conviction must
be based upon sufficient evidence; this requirement became formalized oser the course
of decisions into a rule of law. In the District of Columbia, for example, Kidwell v.
United States, 38 App. D.C. 566, 573 (1912), which noted that those decisions affirming
a conviction on the testimony of the complainant all involved cases in which there was
corroborating circumstantial evidence, later became cited for the proposition that cor-
roboration of the testimony of the complainant was required in cvcry case as a matter
of law. See, e.g., Calhoun v. United States, 399 F.2d 999, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
16. Twenty-five of these states flatly reject the corroboration requirement. See Boddie
v. State, 52 Ala. 395, 398 (1875); Bakken v. State, 489 P.2d 120, 127 (Alas. 1971); Hodges
v. State, 210 Ark. 672, 673, 197 S.V.2d 52, 53 (1946); People v. Stevenson. 275 Cal. App.
2d 645, 650, 80 Cal. Rptr. 392, 395 (2d Dist., 5th Div. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1014
(1970); McQueary v. People, 48 Colo. 214, 218-20, 110 P. 210, 212-13 (1910); State v.
Chuchelow, 131 Conn. 82, 83, 37 A.2d 689 (1944) (dictum); Wilson v. State, 49 Del. 37,
58-59, 109 A.2d 381, 393 (1954) (dictum); State v. Smith, 249 So. 2d 16, 17 (Fla. 1971);
Yearry v. State, - Ind. -, 273 N.E.2d 96, 97-98 (1971); State v. Brown, 85 Kns. 418,
421, 116 P. 508, 509 (1911); Green v. State, 243 Md. 75, 80, 220 A.2d 131, 135 (1966);
Commonwealth v. Bemis, 242 Mass. 582, 585-86, 136 N.E. 597, 598 (192); People v.
Inman, 315 Mich. 456, 471-72, 24 NAV.2d 176, 182 (1946) (dictum); Blade v. State, 240
Miss. 183, 188, 126 So. 2d 278, 280 (1961) (dictum); State v. Bouldin, 153 Mont. 276, 284,
456 P.2d 830, 834 (1969); State v. Diamond, 50 Nev. 433, 437, 264 P. 697, 698 (1928);
State v. Garcia, 83 N.J. Super. 345, 349-50, 199 A.2d 860, 862 (App. Div. 1964); State
v. Johnson, 58 N.D. 832, 841, 227 NAV. 560, 564 (1929); State v. Fitzmauricc, - Ore. -,
475 P.2d 426, 428 (1970); State v. Wiggin, 106 R.I. 69, 73-74, 256 A.2d 219, 22- (1969);
State v. Gatlin, 208 S.C. 414, 418, 38 S.E.2d 238, 240 (1946) (dictum); King v. State, 210
Tenn. 150, 158-59, 357 SAV.2d 42, 45-46 (1962); State v. Hodges, 14 Utah 2d 197, 198-99,
381 P.2d 81, 82 (1963); State v. Thomas, 52 Wash. 2d 255, 256.57, 324 P.2d 821, 822 (1958)
(dictum); Tway v. State, 7 Wyo. 74, 79, 50 P. 188, 189 (1897) (dictum).
The courts of ten other states, while often using the language of a corroboration
requirement, seem to demand only that a conviction for rape be based upon sufficient
evidence. See Reidhead v. State, 31 Ariz. 70, 71-72, 250 P. 366 (1926) (no corroboration
necessary if testimony is reasonable, consistent and not inherently impossible or in-
credible); People v. White, 26 Ill. 2d 199, 202, 186 N.E.2d 351, 352 (1962) (same, if dear
and convincing); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Ky. 1970) (same,
if testimony is not contradictory, incredible or inherently improbable); State v. Field,
157 Me. 71, 76, 170 A.2d 167, 169 (1961) (same, if testimony is not contradictory, un-
reasonable or incredible); Bryant v. State, 478 P.2d 907, 909 (Okl. Cr. 1970) (same, if
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limited corroboration 17 or corroboration only under certain circum-
stances.' 8
B. Substance
Among the fifteen states with some form of requirement, there is
wide variation both as to the elements of the crime which must be
corroborated and as to the evidence considered material for purposes
of corroboration. Under New York's earlier law, corroboration was
required for each material element of the offense-force, penetration,
and identity of the accused.1 9 The revised New York law removes
the need for corroboration of identity, except for statutory rape, and
leaves intact the requirement of corroboration of force. Corroboration
of penetration is no longer required, but in its place is added a
requirement of some "other evidence tending to . . . [e]stablish that
an attempt was made to engage the alleged victim in sexual inter-
course ...at the time of the alleged occurrence .. . ."20 The Dis-
testimony is clear and convincing and not inconsistent, incredible or contradictory),
Commonwealth v. Kretezitis, Ill Pa. Super. 5, 9, 169 A. 417, 418 (19.33) (assault with
intent to commit rape; same, if testimony is not so indefinite, contradictory or tut.
believable as to make it unsafe to rest conviction thereon); State v. Dachtler, 43 S.D.
407, 410-11, 179 N.W. 653 (1920) (same, if testimony is not unreliable or improbable
and if complainant has not been fairly impeached); Fogg v. Commonwealth, 208 Va.
541, 546, 159 S.E.2d 616, 620 (1968) (same, if testimony is credible and if accused's guilt
is believed by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Beacraft, 126 W. Va. 895,
899-90, 30 S.E.2d 541, 544 (1944) (same, if testimony is not inherently incredible),
Gauthier v. State, 28 Wis. 2d 412, 418, 137 N.W2d 101, 105 (1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 916 (1966) (same, if testimony is convincing and not inherently impossible). lit
many of these states, courts have indicated that the uncorroborated testimony of the
complainant, though sufficient to justify a conviction, will be scrutinized with great
care. See, e.g., State v. Field, supra at 76, 170 A.2d at 169.
17. Two states require limited corroboration in the sense of facts and circumstances
which coincide with and tend to establish the truth of the complainant's testimony.
See Territory v. Hayes, 43 Hawaii 58, 62 (1958); State v. Baca, 56 N.M. 236, 241-42, 242
P.2d 1002, 1006 (1952).
18. Six states, through statutes or judicial decisions, have limited the application of
the corroboration requirement to specific factual circumstances. See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 272, § 11 (1968) (applies to, inter alia, certain specified non.forcible rapes); State v.
Artez, 286 Minn. 545, 546, 176 N.W.2d 81, 82 (1970) (corroboration important when
complainant is minor); IMIss. CODE ANN. § 2360 (1956) (applies only to specific statutory
rape); State v. Thomas, 351 Mo. 804, 818, 174 S.W.2d 337, 345 (1943) (corroboration
required in those cases where complainant is mature woman and case is weak); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-3706 (Supp. 1971) (applies only to specific statutory rape); Wright V.
State, 364 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. Cr. App. 1963) (corroboration required only in those
cases where a belated complaint was made).
19. People v. Masse, 5 N.Y.2d 217, 219, 156 N.E.2d 452, 453, 182 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822
(1959).
The Virgin Islands enforces a statutory corroboration requirement very similar to an
earlier New York rule which also had required corroboration of each material element
of the offense. See Virgin Islands v. Carr, 451 F.2d 652, 655-56 (3d Cir. 1971).
20. Law of May 22, 1972, ch. 373, § 1, N.Y. Sess. Law News 195th Sess., June 10,
1972, at 811. Apparently, then, there still must be some corroboration of the sexual nature
of the assault; torn underwear, for example, probably would be sufficient, but facial
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trict of Columbia requires corroboration both of the corpus delicti
(force and penetration) and of the identity of the accused, but the
standard by which the adequacy of identifying evidence is determined
is not as stringent as that required for proof of the offense itself.21
Nebraska requires corroboration, not necessarily of the particular act
constituting rape, but of material facts and circumstances which tend
to support the testimony of the complainant. 22 Other states require
only the most minimal corroboration of any particular aspect of the
complainant's testimony.23
No state requires direct eyewitness testimony to corroborate any
element of the offense.24 Force can be corroborated by physical signs
of recent violent intercourse,2 5 abandonment of articles of clothing
by the victim, 26 the condition of her clothing,2-7 her hysteria,281 and in
some states her prompt complaint to legal authorities. 20 Penetration
is commonly corroborated by medical testimony based on a physical
examination of the complainant,30 but it also can be corroborated by
pregnancy3' or the subsequent birth of a child.32 Identity of the ac-
cused can be corroborated by such evidence as his presence at the
bruises would not. It is not difficult to imagine many instances in which corroboration
sufficient to meet this statutory standard simply will not be available.
Early newspaper accounts of the new law erroneously minimized the extent of the
corroboration requirement retained. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 14, 1972, § 4. at 5, col. 5.
21. United States v. Jenkins, 436 F.2d 140, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Allison v. United
States, 409 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Illinois, in cases in which the victim's testimony is not "clear and convincing,"
People v. White, 26 Ill. 2d 199, 202, 186 N.E.2d 351, 352 (1962), requires corroboration
solely of the corpus delicti and not of the identity of the accused. People v. Price, 96
Ill. App. 2d 86, 94, 238 N.E.2d 881, 884-85 (4th Dist. 1968). Iowa requires precisely the
opposite-corroboration of identity but not of the corpus delicti. IoWA CODE ANN. § 782.4
(1950).
22. State v. Garza, 187 Neb. 407, 191 N.AV.2d 454, 457 (1971). But cf. Yancey v. State,
202 Miss. 662, 668, 32 So. 2d 151, 152 (1947): "[C]orroboration must be, not merely of
incidental details, but of the commission of the prohibited act."
23. See, e.g., State v. Armijo, 25 N.M. 666, 671, 187 P. 553, 555 (1920).
24. See, e.g., Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
318 U.S. 776 (1942); Fager v. State, 22 Neb. 332, 333, 35 N.W. 195, 196 (1887).
25. See, e.g., Prokop v. State, 148 Neb. 582, 588, 28 N.W.2d 200, 203.04 (1917).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 429 F.2d 754. 757 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
27. See, e.g., id.: Hamilton v. State, 169 Ga. 826, 826-27, 151 S.E. 805 (1930).
28. See, e.g., Harper v. State, 201 Ga. 10, 19, 39 S.E.2d 45 (1946); In re F., 327 N.Y.S.2d
237, 239 (Fam. CL, City of N.Y. 1971).
29. See, e.g., Stevens v. State, 222 Ga. 603, 604, 151 S.E.2d 127, 128 (1966); People .
Chambers, 127 111. App. 2d 215, 222, 262 N.E.2d 170, 174 (1st Dist., 2d Div. 1970). Contra
People v. Carey, 223 N.Y. 519, 520, 119 N.E. 83 (1918).
30. See, e.g., People v. Masse, 5 N.Y.2d 217, 219, 156 N.E2d 452, 453, 182 N.Y.S.2d
821, 823 (1959); Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
318 U.S. 776 (1942).
31. See, e.g., People v. Haischer, 81 App. Div. 559, 561, 81 N.Y.S. 79, 81 (4th Dep't
1903).
32. See, e.g., State v. Mason, 41 Idaho 506, 510, 239 P. 733, 734 (1925).
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scene of the crime,33 his opportunity to commit the crimea 4 or the
victim's verifiable recollection of his possessions at the scene of the
crime.35 Any one or all of these three elements of a forcible rape
offense also can be corroborated by admissions of the defendant. 0
Because of the multiplicity of legal rules among states, any attempt
to generalize extensively is, to quote Wigmore, a "waste of . . . time."31
C. Effect
In those states where a corroboration requirement has been enforced
strictly, there has been at least one obvious effect-a comparatively low
rate of conviction for rape.38 The reasons for this phenomenon are
clear. "The nature of the crime is such . . . that eyewitnesses seldom
are available." 39 In many instances of so-called "dark-alley" rapes, even
33. See, e.g., Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
318 U.S. 776 (1942).
34. See, e.g., State v. Fehr, 45 S.D. 634, 638-39, 189 NAV. 9.12, 914 (1922). Contra
State v. Kelly, 249 Iowa 1219, 1224-25, 91 N.W.2d 562, 564.66 (1958).
35. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 427 F.2d 619, 621.22, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
People v. Linzy, 327 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 3d Dep't 1971).
36. See, e.g., People v. Yannucci, 283 N.Y. 546, 550, 29 N.E.2d 185, 186 (1910).
37. 7 J. WiGMioRE, supra note 10, § 2062, at 356.
38. Under New York's earlier corroboration statute, for example, there were 1083
arrests for rape in New York City in 1969 and a mere 18 convictions. N.Y. Times, May 14,
1972, § 4, at 5, col. 5. The corroboration rule in New York would appear to have htd li
enormously negative effect upon the conviction rate. See Ludwig, supra note 2, at 378, 386.
However, empirical data furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation suggests
that the corroboration requirement, as enforced in three states, has a much smaller
effect upon the conviction rate. The table below compares for 1970 the United States
as a whole with the three states which enforce a corroboration requirement in terms
of the number of rape offenses, the number of adults prosecuted per 100 offenses atil
the outcome of the trials. (Information was not available for the District of Columbia,
New York or the Virgin Islands. Idaho's statutory requirement did not take effect
until January 1, 1972.) Guilty
Adults Guilty of lesser Acquittals
Number prosecuted of rape offense or dismils.
of per 100 per 100 per 100 sals per
offenses offenses trials trials 100 trials
Total U.S. 37,273 28.8 36.1 18.4 46.5
Georgia 740 55.3 52.2 7.3 40.5
Iowa 175 53.9 43.6 22.3 34.1
Nebraska 138 23.1 28.1 18.7 53.2
Data derived from information contained in letter from Federal Bureau of Investigation
to Yale Law Journal, May 15, 1972.
Curiously, the percentage of adult prosecutions and the percentage of rape convictions
were actually well above the national average in Georgia and Iowa, though they were
below it in Nebraska. The higher conviction rates, relative to total offenses as well as
to trials, in Georgia and Iowa cannot be explained by their enforcement of a corrobora
tion requirement. It may be that these states have a conviction rate above the national
average in similar crimes; or they may place greater emphasis by police and prosecttors
on rape cases. Such explanations, however, are purely conjectural. In any event, repeal
of the corroboration rule in these two states would probably not affect the conviction
rate in a manner as dramatic as would elimination of it in New York.
39. Stapleman v. State, 150 Neb. 460, 464, 34 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1948). This statement
is borne out by an exhaustive empirical study of American jury trials which found that
the prosecution had eye-witness testimony, in addition to that of the victim, in only
four per cent of the rape cases. H. KALVEN &- H. ZEISEL, TmE AMERiCAN jvst 142 (1966).
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circumstantial evidence corroborating the complainant's identification
of the accused is not likely to be available.40 Such outdoor rapes also
lack the broken furniture that often serves as corroboration of force
in indoor rapes. 41 Frequently there is no circumstantial physical cor-
roboration for the simple reason that no physical force was employed
in the rape.42° Menachem Amir's recent study of 646 forcible rapes
reveals that many women, when confronted with a weapon-wielding
assailant, make the sensible decision not to resist physically.43 These
women will lack the bruises and torn clothing that would othenise
corroborate the assailant's use of force.4 4 Likewise, most women douche
after assault.45 As a result, medical examination will rarely reveal the
presence of sperm in the victim's vaginal secretions, and the possibility
of medical corroboration of penetration diminishes. 40 For all these
reasons the corroboration requirement will often virtually bar suc-
cessful prosecution.
The corroboration requirement thus has an obvious potential for
discriminatory effect. The crime of rape is unique among criminal
offenses because it always involves a female complainant and a male
defendant.47 For this reason it has been suggested that the extra bur-
den of corroboration may be an instance of the law's unequal treatment
of women. 48 In rebuttal, others have argued that the corroboration
requirement is not antifeminist since it applies also to sodomy cases,
40. See, e.g., In re F., 327 N.Y.S.2d 237, 238-39 (Fai. CL, City of N.Y. 1971) in whichl
charges of attempted rape and oral sodomy were dismissed for lack of corroboration of
identification.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Huff, 442 F.2d 885, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1971), in which the
court held that evidence that the apartment door had been forced open and that the
furniture had been disarranged corroborated the complainant's testimony that she had
been raped.
42. M. AMIR, PATrERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 155 (1971), notes that there was an absencc
of use of physical force by the assailant in nearly fifteen per cent of the rapes studied.
43. Id. at 169.
44. See p. 1369 supra.
45. Graves & Francisco, Medicolegal Aspects of Rape, 4 Mfx. Asi'acrs or Hu.,.
SEXUALITY, April 1970, at 109, 116.
46. Id. However, since ejaculation is not a necessary element in a rape offense, see,
e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 11-1(b) (1972), medical testimony concerning signs of
violent sexual intercourse still can corroborate penetration. See, e.g., People v. Masse,
5 N.Y.2d 217, 219, 156 N.E.2d 452, 453, 182 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (1959).
47. The sexual element of a rape also gives it a distinctive daracteristic. Some
victims, however, are more upset over the beating that accompanied the rape, The
Story of Maxwell Kent-Rapist, Washington Post, June 18, 1967, § C, at 1, col. 4, or
even over the theft of a purse or other personal property, J. MAcDONALD, RAPE: 01-
FENDERS AND THEIR VIcrMMS 96 (1971), than over the rape itself.
48. Younger, supra note 8, at 276 n.105. This sexist aspect may cien raise consti.
tutional issues. New York's revised corroboration law is thought by snome to be a
denial to women of equal protection of the laws; the contention is that wvomncn are
not getting the same deterrent effect from the law as men. See N.Y. Times, May 14,
1972, § 4, at 5, col. 5.
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which may involve male victims, as well as to rape cases.40 Nonetheless,
the overwhelming majority of such "sex crimes" involve female victims
and male assailantsO so the abstract consistency of treatment by no
means establishes sexual impartiality of a corroboration rule in practice.
As a result of its negative effect on successful prosecutions for rape,
as well as its implied mistrust of one form of female testimony, the
corroboration requirement has been criticized by some courts.61 Yet,
within the past four years at least two states have adopted or substan-
tially broadened statutes preventing a man from being convicted for
rape on the uncorroborated testimony of a woman.52 The recent
statutory revision in New York,"3 rather than representing a counter
trend, should be viewed as a tactical retreat from an extreme form of
the corroboration requirement which had made convictions for rape
virtually unobtainable.54
49. See Letter to the Editor from J.F. Lisa, N.Y. State Assemblyman, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 27, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
Most states do apply the same corroboration requirement to sodomy charges as to
rape charges. Statutory corroboration requirements for rape also apply to sodomy liI
Idaho and New York, but they do not in Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi and
Tennessee. See note 13 supra. Both jurisdictions imposing a broad corroboration re-
quirement in the absence of legislation (Nebraska and the District of Columbia) also
apply it to sodomy charges. Coltrane v. United States, 418 F.2d 1131, 113-1.35 (D.C. Cir.
1969); State v. Narcisse, 187 Neb. 209, 188 N.W.2d 715, 717 (1971). Of the remainingjurisdictions that impose a lesser corroboration requirement in cases of rape, most
impose a similar one in cases of sodomy. See, e.g, Hopper v. State, 302 P.2d 162, 161-65
(Okla. Cr. App. 1956). Contra Oliva v. State, 459 SAV.2d 824, 825-26 (Tex. Cr. App, 1970).
50. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 39, at 197, state that all 176 of the defendants
in rape cases, all forty-eight of the incest defendants, and forty-five of the forty-six
sodomy defendants involved in the study were male.
51. See, e.g., Conoway v. State, 171 Ga. 782, 785, 156 SE. 664, 666 (1931); In re F.,
327 N.Y.S.2d 237, 239-43 (Fam. Ct., City of N.Y. 1971). See also 7 j. w toar, supra note
10, § 2061, at 354-55.
52. Prior to 1969 Georgia had a statutory corroboration requirement for sexual in'
tercourse with a female under the age of fourteen, Law of July 31, 1918, § 2 [1918] ca.
Acts 259-60, and a very similar common-law corroboration requirement for forcible
rape. Wright v. State, 184 Ga. 62, 68-69, 190 S.E. 663, 667 (1937). In 1968 it adopted a
new penal code, effective July 1, 1969, with a provision requiring corroboration in all
rape cases, both statutory and forcible. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (rev. ed. 1971).
Prior to 1972 Idaho had a common-law rule permitting conviction of rape upon
the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant only when the reputation of the
complainant for chastity and truth was unimpeached and where the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense were clearly corroborative of her statements,
See, e.g., cases cited in State v. Elsen, 68 Idaho 50, 53-54, 187 P.2d 976, 977-78 (1917),
Effective January 1, 1972, it adopted a new penal and correctional code incorporating
the Model Penal Code's provision on corroboration, MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(6) (Pro.
posed Official Draft 1962), into the new code, IDAHO PEN. AND CORR. CODE § 18-907(1)
(1971).
A third state, Washington, is presently considering the adoption of a revised criminal
code which includes a corroboration requirement. See REVISED WVASINGTON CRISIINAL
CODE § 9A.44.010 (Proposed Draft, Dec. 3, 1970).
53. See p. 1368 supra.
54. See note 38 supra.
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II. Justifications for a Corroboration Requirement
The justifications propounded in favor of an exceptional corrobora-
tion requirement in charges of rape are threefold: first, the frequency
of false charges of rape; second, the emotion raised in a jury by a charge
of rape; and, third, the difficulty in disproving an accusation of rape.
A. Frequency of False Rape Charges
It is generally believed that false accusations of sex crimes in gen-
eral, and rape in particular, are much more common than untrue
charges of other crimes. 5z A number of different motives may prompt
a deliberately falsified accusation of rape. A woman may consent to
sexual intercourse with a man, then feel ashamed of herself and bitter
at her partner, and bring charges of rape against him.ao Or, she may
have become pregnant and accuse an entirely innocent party for the
purpose of shielding the man who actually caused her pregnancy.57
A woman may falsify charges for the purpose of blackmail.58 Or she
may do so solely out of hatred or revenge, 0 or for notoriety.00
55. Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, supra note 8, at 1138. See Ploscowe, Sex
Offenses: The American Legal Context, 25 L,w & Co.'TE.ttp. Pnou. 217, 019-23 (1960),
which advocates a requirement of corroboration in all sex offense charges because of
the purported frequency of unfounded complaints.
56. "[Y]oung girls, like older females, sometimes concoct an untruthful story to
conceal a lapse from virtue." State v. Connelly, 57 Minn. 482, 486, 59 NAV. 479, 481
(1894); Williams, Corroboration-Sexual Cases, 1962 CsuM. L. REv. 662.
57. A. HERzo, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 827 (1931); J. ,MAcDoAL, supra note 47, at 211.
58. See, e.g., Dunn v. State, 127 Tenn. 267, 281, 154 SA. 969, 972 (1913), in which
the complainant testified:
that what she swore on the former trial was false; that she had already become a
girl of bad character at the time the plaintiff in error had relations with her, and
that she was induced to make false statements by her mother to enable the latter
to force money from plaintiff in error, and also to break up the criminal relations
existing between him and her sister Maggie; that is to separate them, so that her
mother could obtain money by using Maggie as a lure for other men.
In Martinez v. State, 123 Tex. Cr. 572, 573, 59 SAV.2d 410 (1933), there was evidence
introduced that the mother of the complainant had attempted to negotiate a settlement
with the defendant in return for the dropping of charges.
Medical personnel are thought to be particularly" vulnerable to such blackmail:
Many accusations of rape have been made against ph)sicians and dentists. Most
of these are deliberate false charges for purposes of blackmail or collecting money
by suit or settlement ....
A. HERzoc, supra note 57, at 845-46.
59. "The adage, 'Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned.' is frequently encountered
in rape prosecutions." M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAw 187 (1951). See also J. McDONALD,
supra note 47, at 210-11. See, e.g., Shock v. State, 200 Ind. 469, 469-70, 164 N.E. 625,
625-26 (1929); State v. Anderson, 272 Minn. 384, 385, 137 N.E.2d 781, 782 (1965).
60. Psychiatrists are inclined to relate this phenomenon [relating a rape which
never took place] as a bit of testimony to the fact that for some women it is better
to be raped than ignored.
Geis, Group Sexual Assaults, 5 MED. Ast, crs oF HU.v&A% SExUALTrv, May, 1971, at 101,
109. See generally J. MAcDONALD, supra note 47, at 209-31 for an exhaustive list of
conscious motivations for false claims of rape.
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There are several factors, however, which discourage accusations of
rape, whatever their motive. For example, there are the stigma that
attach to the victim of an incident culturally defined as sordid,01
and the humiliation caused by some forms of publicity associated with
such charges. 2 Also to be considered are the necessity of confronting
the assailant03 and the reluctance to face the barbs and insinuations
of the defense attorney.0 4 There is, in addition, the fear of retaliation
from the accused rapist or his friends.6 Finally, there is the deterrent
effect of the existence of the corroboration requirement itself, at least
to the extent that a potential complainant may be aware of it.
These disincentives are so powerful that many real victims of rape
avoid reporting incidents. Statistics indicate that rape is "one of the
most under-reported crimes ... ."" The President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in 1967 estimated
that forcible rapes exceeded by more than three and a half times the
61. Rape seems to arouse in most people a feeling of disgust, perhaps generated
by the repressions surrounding aggressive sex; and the disgust may spread to the
body of the victim who is somehow thought to be contaminated by the experience.
Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objective of
the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 73 (1952). See K. MILLET, SEXUAL POLITICS 44
(1970).
62. K. MILLET, supra note 61, at 44. See Toll, Rape: Reliving the Horror Eases the
Pain, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 16, 1972, § 5, 2, col. 4, for a report of a forum on rape
in Chicago. The humiliation of the rape experience was reflected in one woman's
statement:
I would never say I was raped. I would always say I was attacked .... Even talking
about it now. I feel ashamed, as if I admit I did something wrong.
In some states this publicity is reduced by criminal statutes prohibiting the naming
or identification of a victim of a rape or a similar sexual assault. See, e.g., FLA. SlAT.
ANN. § 794.03 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (rev. ed. 1971); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 912.02
(1958).
Women's descriptions of their rape experiences related at a "Speak.Out on Rape"
organized by New York City women's groups in 1970 illustrated the humiliation which
comes from simply reporting a rape to the police:
Police reactions described at the meeting were a sorry lot. Disbelief. Ridicule.
Questioning along voyeuristic lines. Or just plain lack of interest.
Sheehy, Nice 'Girls Don't Get Into Trouble, 4 NEW YORK, Feb. 15, 1971, at 26, 28.
For an account of a typical rape situation as told by the victim to a journalist, see
The Story of Maxwelt Kent-Rapist, supra note 47, at 1, col. 1. Perhaps the most striking
feature of this account is the callousness of the police toward the victim.
63. The embarrassment of the victim in relating the details of her assault In a
public trial may be reduced with no harm to the accused by conducting the trial with
less publicity than cases ordinarily are. For example, the trial may be held in the
petit jury room rather than the larger court room. For discussion of this possibility,
see Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 387, 91 A. 417, 422-23 (1913).
64. See, e.g., Griffin, Rape: The All.American Crime, 10 RAMPARTS, Sept. 1971, at
26, 31-32, for a description of a particularly brutal defense examination ot the sexual
mores of the complainant in a rape case. But see Wigmore's suggestion that there be
wide-open admissibility of evidence bearing on the complainant's moral and mental
qualities. 3A J. NVIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924(b), at 747-48 (Chadbourne rev. ed, 1970). Such
a rule would make testifying to a rape even more unpleasant than it is at present.
65. J. MACDONALD, supra note 47, at 27, 72-73.
66. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVsTMIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1970 14 (1971).
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reported rate.67 Other estimates of the percentage of rapes actually
reported run as low as five per cent0 s or even lower., Even if she
reports the offense, a complaining witness may refuse to prosecute, in
large part to avoid having to relive a traumatic and humiliating ex-
perience for the benefit of the judge and jury. A study in Detroit,
for example, showed that in nearly thirty-three per cent of the rape
offenses reported to the police, the complainant subsequently refused
to prosecute her assailant, and charges had to be dropped. 0
It might be thought that the disincentives which cause such gross
under-reporting do not deter those motivated to make false accusations.
Perhaps motives such as blackmail or revenge are stronger than the
desire to see one's assailant brought to justice and are more likely to
overcome a woman's reluctance to face the humiliation and publicity
that follow a report of rape. Such conjecture is impossible to disprove.
On balance, however, there is strong reason to doubt that a large
number of women will use a rape charge as a vehicle for blackmail
or revenge. 7' The number will almost certainly be so small that mod-
em techniques of criminal investigation 2 and traditional legal rules,
other than the corroboration requirement, will effectively protect
innocent defendants. 7 3 There is, moreover, no requirement for cor-
roboration of other crimes, including physical assaults, which are
equally subject to intentional falsification and lack many of the dis-
incentives which discourage rape accusations. The possibility of de-
liberate falsification, alone, cannot justify the corroboration require-
ment as a special rule of evidence in rape cases.
67. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION o\ LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TIlE ADMINts'IIATION OF Jus-
TiCE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SociE'y 21 (1967).
68. W. Haines, quoted in Wittels, What Can We Do About Sex Crimes, 221 Sw x .,Y
EvENIxG POSr, Dec. 11, 1948, at 30, 31.
69. Cf. Kanin, Sex Aggression by College Men, 4 MED. AsPmars OF HUMA. SLXU M',
at 25, 29 (1970).
70. L. Laughlin, The Disposition of Sex Complaints at the Level of Police Inves-
tigation 6, 58 (unpublished master's thesis in Wayne State University Library 1950). Sce
also J. MAcDONALD, supra note 47, at 94-96.
71. A woman bent on blackmail or revenge also may choose a rape charge because
of its relative ease of fabrication. Even if she stands a slim chance of success, in the
sense of obtaining a conviction, the typically severe punishment for rape makes the
stakes high, see p. 1381 infra, and an unsuccessful rape prosecution probably still Lxacts
a greater toll in embarrassment from the defendant than would a trial for another
criminal charge.
In estimating the frequency of these deliberate falsifications of rape, the 'adiantages"
of a rape accusation must be balanced against its "disadvantages"-the embarrassment
and publicity incident to a report of rape, see p. 1374 supra, and the difficulty in
obtaining a conviction. See p. 1379 infra. Although weighing these imponderables is
highly conjectural, it seems likely that a woman bent upon blackmail or revenge would
be inclined to choose a more effective and less embarrassing tactic.
72. See generally J. MAcDoNALD, supra note 47 at 276-94.
73. See p. 1385 infra.
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But false rape charges need not be deliberate. A false rape charge
can be provoked "by a woman's honest and understandable confusion
over what was done to her, or by whom. 74 Even if it be conceded that
the reliability of a rape victim's testimony may be reduced by the shock
of her experience, is her credibility so much more suspect than that
of any other victim of a violent physical assault as to warrant a dis.
tinctive rule of evidence? Street crimes of all types can raise serious
problems of identification; yet the law does not demand corroboration
of the victim's testimony to sustain a conviction for them.
A more serious problem, however, is raised by the false rape charge
rooted in pure fantasy. 5 A woman may convincingly represent a fan-
tasized attack as an actual event.76 Such charges may be relatively
invulnerable to ordinary law enforcement investigation and to im-
peachment through cross-examination.7 7
Many psychiatrists and physicians once considered fantasies of rape
to be extremely common among women.78 Dr. Karl A. Menninger has
said that such fantasies are so common that they may be considered
universal.79 The most frequent explanation for these fantasies is that
they represent "an unrealized wish or unconscious, deeply suppressed
sex-longing or thwarting."80 According to this theory, "the normal
woman who has such a fantasy does not confuse it with reality, but it
is ... easy for some neurotic individuals to translate their fantasies
into actual beliefs and memory falsifications . . .. "I
Perhaps the most carefully considered theory that purports to ex-
plain these fantasies has been propounded by the psychoanalyst Helene
Deutsch. She assimilated rape fantasies to a theory of female maso-
chism,82 a corollary to Freud's concept of "penis envy."83 She con-
tended that fantasies of violent sexual intercourse without consent are
74. Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, supra note 8, at 1143.
75. See Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape, supra note 61, at 69; Williams, supra
note 56, at 662. For accounts of rape charges based in fantasy, see sourccs quoted in SA
J. WICMORE, supra note 64, § 924(a), at 736-46.
76. See 1 H. DEUTSCH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 123-24, 255-56 (1944).
77. See Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape, supra note 61, at 69.
78. See, e.g., sources cited in 3A J. wicraioRE, supra note 64, § 924(a), at 736-16; M.
GuTTMACHER & H. EIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND TIlE LAW 375 (1952), W. OvFRIIOLSLLI,
THE PSYCHIATRISr AND THE LAW 53 (1953).
79. K. Menninger, quoted in 3A J. WIGMoRE, supra note 641, § 924(a), at 744.
80. W. Lorenz, quoted in id. 745-46. See also W. White, quoted in id. 745.
81. K. Menninger, quoted in id. 744.
82. See 1 H. DEUTSCH, supra note 76, at 239-78.
83. See generally S. FREUD, Femininity, in 22 THE STANDARD EDITION OF TilE COMI'LUf
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 112-35 (J. Strachey ed. & transl. 1961); Female
Sexuality, in 21 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCiHOLOGICAL WORKS OF
SIGMUND FREUD 225-43 (J. Strachey ed. and transl. 1961); Some Psychical Consequences
of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes, in 19 id. 248-58.
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a manifestation of the "attraction of suffering [that] is incomparably
stronger for women than for men."814 Because the theories of penis
envy and female masochism are rooted in the physiology of women
and hence are considered characteristic of "normal" female psychology,
Deutsch's theory predicts a high frequency of rape fantasies, many of
which become public accusations.sa
Deutsch's theory, however, has been largely discredited in recent
years.86 Some have criticized her, as well as Freud, for using clinical
experience with abnormal patients to derive theories of normal female
psychology.8 7 Others have criticized her for failing to consider the
social context in which women live.86 The effect of any biological
characteristic is very strongly conditioned, perhaps even dominated,8 9
by the culture-complex in which the particular woman has developed.
If these cultural factors are considered, and if today's culture is com-
pared with that in which Freud and even Deutsch developed their
theories, the incidence of female masochism very likely will be far
less than it may ever have been in the past.°0
84. 1 H. DEUTSCH, supra note 76, at 274 (emphasis removed from original).
85. See id. 256.
86. For a thorough review of the literature regarding ps)choanal)tic theories of
female development see S. WVeisskopf, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Female Develop-
ment (unpublished Ph.D. thesis in Harvard University Library 1972). Wcisskopf con-
cludes that the Freudian theory of female development is inadequate; it is based on
critical assumptions which are not valid and employs certain important constructs for
which there is no evidence. Id. 133, 150.
87. See, e.g., K. HORNEY, FEMININE PSYCHOLOGY 215-17 (1967); K. MiLu., supra note
61, at 179; Veisstein, "Kinder, Kuche, Kirdhe" as Scientific Law: Psychology Constructs
the Female, in SIsrEmHooD Is POWERFUL 205, 209-13 (R. Morgan ed. 1970).
88. See, e.g., K. HORNEY, supra note 87, at 229-33; K. MILLET, supra note 61, at 179,
187; C. THOMPSON, PSYCHOANALYSIS: EVOLUTION AND DEv.LoPMENr 131 (1950); Weisstein,
supra note 87, at 208-09, 213-18.
89. See Weisstein, supra note 87, at 209:
Compared to the influence of the social context within which a perso lives, his
or her history or "traits," as well as biological makeup may simply be random
variations, "noise" superimposed on the true signal which can predict behavior.
90. Karen Homey, a neo-Freudian psychoanal)st, suggests several social factors whidt
predispose to the appearance of female masochism:
1. Blocking of outlets for expansiveness and sexuality;
2. Restriction in the number of children, inasmuch as having and rearing children
supplies the woman with various gratifying outlets (tenderness, achievement,
self-esteem), and this becomes all the more important when having and rearing
children is the measuring rod of social evaluation;
3. Estimation of women as beings who are, on the whole, inferior to men (insofar
as it leads to a deterioration of female self-confidence);
4. Economic dependence of women on men or on family, inasmuch as it fosters
an emotional adaptation in the way of emotional dependence;
5. Restriction of women to spheres of life that arc built chiefly upon emotional
bonds, such as family life, religion, or charity work;
6. Surplus of marriageable women, particularly when marriage offers the principal
opportunity for sexual gratification, children, security, and social recognition.
K. HORNEY, supra note 87, at 230.
An analysis of these factors suggests that the frequency of occurrence of female
masochism will decline as inhibitions on female sexual expression are lifted, as women
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Thus, whatever may have been the former validity of the theory
that female masochism will lead women to fantasize rape incidents,
its currency today has been largely eroded, and will be increasingly
eroded as women acquire social, legal and economic equality with
men. Insofar as the corroboration requirement in rape cases has been
justified by the danger of false rape charges brought by fantasizing
women, it is linked to a psychological theory that fails to take into
account the changing role of women in American society.
No doubt, a small number of women may fantasize rapes; but this
fact alone is an insufficient basis for a rigid corroboration rule. Rather
than create a general rule of evidence to protect potential defendants
from a few psychotic complainants, such a problem can best be han-
dled on an ad hoc basis by trial judges and reviewing courts as it is
for other criminal charges.91
B. Emotion Raised by a Charge of Rape
The second explicit justification for a corroboration requirement
in rape cases is the suspicion that in such cases the presumption of
innocence to which a defendant is legally entitled is likely to give way
to "the respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a
wronged female . -2 This alleged danger of unfair prejudice
against the defendant in a rape case has two elements. It is believed
that "the heinousness of the offense" may transport "the judge and
the jury with so much indignation that they are hastily carried to the
conviction of the person accused . . . ."93 Also, juries are thought to
be "preinclined to believe a man guilty of any illicit sexual offense
he may be charged with, and it seems to matter little what his pre-
vious reputation has been."0 4
acquire legal, economic and educational equality with men, as the economic dependence
of women on men and the family is lifted, as restrictions upon female employmnent and
community involvement disappear, and as marriage and the family cease to be the
exclusive foci of female life. Clara Thompson, another neo-Freudian psychoanalyst,
argues further that many of these cultural changes have occurred and that, as a result,
"a new type of woman Is emerging, a woman . . . whose characteristics differ from
those described by Freud." C. TnmOMPSON, INTERPERSONAL PSYCHOANALYSIS 238 (1961).
91. See pp. 1384-86 infra.
92. 3A J. VuMom, supra note 64, § 924(a), at 736.
93. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 636 (1680). See Davis v. State, 120 Ga. 433, 435, 48
S.E. 180, 182 (1904):
When a charge of this sort [rape] is made, the people, and the jurors likewise, are
apt to let their indignation get the better of their judgment and convict upon
evidence which does not authorize it.
94. Roberts v. State, 106 Neb. 362, 367, 183 NAV. 555, 557 (1921). See State v. Connelly,
57 Minn. 482, 486, 59 NAV. 479, 481 (1894): "The crime [rape] is so abhorrent that, to
some minds, to charge a person with it, raises a presumption of guilt."
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This second justification can be evaluated on the basis of existing
empirical evidence. Are rape convictions, in fact, easier to obtain than
convictions for other offenses? Do juries get swept away in a fit of
passion and hastily convict men on the likely-sounding testimony of
women who allege sexual assaults?
Kalven and Zeisel's exhaustive empirical study of criminal juries in
America reveals that convictions for "non-aggravated rape"03 are ex-
traordinarily rare.9 6 This same study shows that juries, in their efforts
to acquit defendants of rape charges, have created a special extra-legal
defense-contributory behavior on the part of the complainant. 7 When
the jury perceives that the complainant somehow assumed the risk of
rape,98 it will attempt to find the defendant guilty of some lesser crime
or, if this option is not available, acquit him totally.° 9
The finding that rape convictions are difficult to obtain should be
no surprise to experienced criminal attorneys. Rape trials are often
heard before largely male juries'00 which are considered to be un-
sympathetic to the prosecution, especially in cases where the complain-
ant and the defendant knew each other prior to the alleged rape.101
Thus, the existing evidence indicates that juries view rape charges
95. "Aggravated rape," a generic term of art used by Kahen and Zeisel, includes all
cases in which there is evidence of extrinsic violence or in which there are several as.
sailants or in which the defendant and the victim were complete strangers at the time
of the event. "Simple rape" (which for purposes of clarity will be referred to as "non-
aggravated rape" in this Note) includes all other rapes. H. KALVE.; & H. ZEISEL, SUpra
note 39, at 252.
96. The jury convicted defendants of rape in just three of the forty.two cases of
non-aggravated rape studied by Kalven and Zeisel, whereas the judge would have con-
victed in twenty-two of these. Id. 253-54. The conviction rate is too low to be attrib-
utable to the corroboration requirement itself. See p. 1383 and note 124 infra.
97. Id. 249-54.
98. Assumption of risk took the form of such behavior as acconpanying the de-
fendant to his house or allowing him to accompany her to hers, joining the defendant
at a beer-drinking party, or merely having given birth to an illegitimate child in the
past. Id. 249-51.
99. Id. 254.
100. See statement by N.Y.C. District Attorney J. Liunan, quoted in Lear, supra
note 1, at 11. Some jurisdictions even allow women an absolute exemption which they
must affirmatively request from jury service, based solely on sex. See, e.g., GA. CODE
A,NN. § 59-124 (1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 43-116, 117 (1949); Mo. CoNsr., Art1. q .2(b);
McKINNEY's CONSOL. N.Y. LAws, c. 30, Judiciary Law § 507(7) (Supp. 1968); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 9-9-11 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 22-101, 108 (1955).
No state prohibits women from service on juries altogether. Alabama's prohibition
having been found unconstitutional in White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala.
1966). The issue of a statutory exclusion of women who do not volunteer for grand jury
service recently was before the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Louisiana, 92 S. Ct. 1221
(1972), but the Court did not reach it, upsetting the conviction on other grounds. In
a concurring opinion Justice Douglas did reach this issue; he would have held this
exclusion to be a denial of the petitioner's right to a trial by an impartial jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community. Id. at 1227-32.
101. See statement by N.Y.C. District Attorney J. Litman, quoted in Lear, supra
note 1, at 11.
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with extraordinary suspicion and rarely return convictions in the
absence of aggravating circumstances, such as extrinsic violence. 10
In one instance, however, the danger of extreme emotions cannot
be dismissed. This is the situation in which a black man has been
accused of raping a white woman, and the case is heard before a
predominately white jury. In such circumstances, several hundred
black men have been convicted and executed,103 particularly in the
South.104
Here, perhaps, there is some merit to the contention that the pre-
sumption of innocence may crumble under the rage of the jury. There
are means more appropriate and effective'"3 than the corroboration
requirement, however, for dealing with these relatively infrequent
cases.106 Congress has long provided a criminal sanction for excluding
blacks from jury service because of their race;' 0 ' and a criminal con-
viction of a black cannot stand under the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment if it is based on an indictment of a grand
jury'08 or a conviction by a petit jury'0 9 from which blacks were ex-
cluded by reason of their race. If the prejudice against the defendant
102. Rape defendants and their attorneys appear to be aware of this suspicion of
juries toward accusations of rape. Kalven and Zeisel's study indicates that waivers of
the right to a jury trial are relatively infrequent in rape cases. H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsrL,
supra note 39, at 29.
103. Of the 455 men executed for rape since 1930, 405 (89 per cent) were black.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATIsTICs No. 45, CAPITAL PUNISIIMENT 1930.1968,
at 10-11 (1969).
104. See generally J. DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN 162-72 (3d ed.
1957), which discusses the attitudes of Southerners toward sexual relations between
black men and white women.
Rape is, of course, an atrocious act to everyone in our society; to a [white?] southern
man, when it is committed by a Negro on a white woman, it is in a class by itself
and justifies the severest punishment.
Id. 164.
105. See H. LEE, To KILL A 'MOCKINGBIRD 173-226 (1960), one of the best known
fictional representations of a false rape charge brought by a white woman against a
black man in a southern town. A corroboration requirement wotld not have aided
the innocent defendant in this case since the alleged victim's testimony was substan'
tially corroborated by that of her father, both as to the corpus delicti and as to the
identity of the accused.
106. M. AMIR, supra note 42, at 44, reports that in the 646 rape events studied,
seventy-seven per cent involved a black victim and a black offender; eighteen per cent)
a white victim and a white offender; four per cent, a black victim and a white offender;
and a mere three per cent, a white victim and a black offender.
107. No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed
by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or of any State on account of race, color or previous condition of
servitude; and whoever, being an officer or other person charged with any duty
in the selection or summoning of jurors, excludes or fails to summon any citizen
for such cause, shall be fined not more than $5,000.
18 U.S.C. § 243 (1970).
108. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 92 S. Ct. 1221, 1224-26 (1972).
109. See, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 560-61 (1953).
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is localized, he may be entitled to a change of venue. 11 0 Where an
obviously biased jury has failed to believe strong evidence of inno-
cence, the presiding judge or the appellate court can and must set
aside the verdict." 1 Thus, the corroboration requirement is neither
the only nor the best means for dealing with the problem of a racially
inflamed jury.
The apparent suspicion of juries toward non-aggravated rape charges,
at least in the absence of racial factors, may be buttressed by their
recognition that very severe penalties accompany a conviction for rape.
Sixteen states still prescribe capital punishment for rape.1"2 In the
remainder, long prison sentences are the rule, frequently with lengthy
minimum terms.113 When England in the early nineteenth century
had a list of some 230 capital offenses, juries felt that the death pen-
alty was so disproportionate for most crimes that they refused to con-
vict. 1 4 Likewise, today, juries may find the penalty for rape (in the
absence of excessive violence) or for statutory rape"1 so excessive that
they refuse to return a conviction for rape"06 although they find the
defendant's conduct reprehensible. Insofar as this balancing of the
offense against the penalty occurs in jury deliberations over rape cases,
it constitutes additional evidence to refute the notion that juries are
110. See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, 147 Tex. Cr. 436, 440, 181 S.W.2d 87, 89 (1944) (dictum).
But see Irvin v. State, 66 So. 2d 288, 290-93 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 927 (1954).
in which a request for a change of venue from the county in which the rape was com-
mitted was granted, but a second request was denied in spite of defendant's allegation
that he still would not be able to get a fair trial.
111. See In re F., 327 N.Y.S.2d 237, 241 (Fain. CL, City of N.Y. 1971), for one judge's
prediction of how New York courts would deal with this type of verdict.
112. ALA. CODE tit. 14 § 395 (1958); ARK. STAT. § 41-3403 (Supp. 1969); FL%. STAT.
ANN. § 794.01 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (rev. ed. 1971); Ky. REv. STAT. § 435.090
(1960); LA. REv. STAT. § 14-42 (1951); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § .161 (1971); Miss. CornE A% .
§ 2358 (1956); Mo. STAT. AN. § 559.260 (1953); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.363 (1968) (only
where offense results in substantial bodily harm to victim); N.C. GE-. STAT. § 14-21 (1969);
OKLA. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1115 (Supp. 1971); S.C. CODE .\AN.N. § 16-72 (192); TEN.
CODE ANN. § 39-3702 (1955); TF-x. PEN. CODE art. 1189 (1961); VA. CODE A,. 8 18.1-44
(1960).
113. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4721 (Supp. 1971), which calls for a minimum
term of fifteen years if the convicted inflicted serious bodily harn upon an)one.
114. H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsE.L, supra note 39, at 310-11.
115. The crime of statutory rape appears to be particularly inconsistent with popular
attitudes. When confronted with the facts of a typical statutory rape situation in a
questionnaire submitted to 165 New Haven residents in 1952, few laymen labelled the
episode "rape." Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape, supra note 61, at 75. See also,
Slovenko, Statutory Rape, 5 MED. ASPECTS OF Hu.t.' SEXUALITY 15 1 (1971), who rec-
ommends fundamental reevaluation of the law of statutory rape.
116. H. KALVEN 9: H. ZFAsL, supra note 39, at 311-12.
This tendency of juries to refuse to convict a man of rape if the) feel that the punish-
ment is too severe is a strong argument against lengthy minimum sentences for rape.
particularly because these sentences do not seem to have a deterrent effect upol the
commission of rapes. See Schwarts, The Effect in Philadelphia of Pennsylvania's Increased
Penalties for Rape and Attempted Rape, 59 J. CGuMt. L.C. & P.S. 509 (1968).
1381
The Yale Law Journal
swept away emotionally by the cry of a woman that she has been
sexually assaulted.
C. Difficulty in Defending Against an Accusation of Rape
The third explicit justification for a corroboration requirement in
rape cases is the imagined difficulty encountered by an innocent man
in defending himself from an accusation of rape. In the famous words
of Lord Chief Justice Hale, rape "is an accusation easily to be made
and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party ac-
cused, tho never so innocent." 17 The problem has been most precisely
stated by a student Note writer:
If the defendant was never alone with the prosecutrix at all, he
may be fortunate enough to have an alibi. But if he has not, or
if the prosecution. can show that he was with her when the crime
allegedly occurred, how is he to establish that he never achieved
penetration, or that she consented?""
Rape charges are peculiar, though not unique, in this respect-the issue
of whether or not a crime was even committed may turn solely on
the conflicting testimony of the complainant and the defendant.'"
The corroboration requirement, in effect, is a prior determination
that if the prosecution's case stands solely on the testimony of the
complainant, the defendant shall win.
In order to evaluate the effect of such a determination, two ques-
tions must be answered: first, how many rape cases rely upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the complainant and, second, how do
juries customarily resolve these cases in the absence of a corroboration
requirement?
As to the first question, Kalven and Zeisel's study shows that in
not one of the seventy-two rape cases encountered in their sample did
the prosecution rely only on the testimony of the complainant. -0
Although eyewitnesses were rare,' 2 ' police testified in the majority of
117. 1 M. HALE, supra note 93, at 635.
118. Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, supra note 8, at 1139.
119. Conviction on a perjury charge, for which the common law did rcqttlre cor-
roboration, see p. 1366 supra, also may turn solely on the conflicting testimony of two
witnesses. There are, of course, other crimes that may rely solely upon the testimony
of the victim for which corroboration is not required. See, c.g., Duncan v. LottIsiana,
391 U.S. 145, 147 (1968) in which the appellant, a black man, was convicted of simple
battery committed upon a white man. In this case the testimony of the victim was
corroborated by his companions, but such corroboration was not a legal necessity for
conviction.
120. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISE., supra note 39, at 141.
121. See note 39 supra.
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trials, and there was testimony of family and friends of the complain-
ant or of experts in many.12 2 Overall, the average number of prose-
cution witnesses was 6.3.123 Although the study does not describe the
content of each witness's testimony, and, thus, we do not know whether
this testimony corroborated the victim's, these statistics suggest that
uncorroborated testimony of the complainant is rare indeed. To some
degree this apparent paucity of non-corroborated rape cases may be
a product of the corroboration rule itself; but because Kalven and
Zeisel's cases were drawn from the entire nation and because only a
handful of jurisdictions impose a rigorous corroboration requirement,
the existence of such rules probably did not significantly affect their
findings. 2 4 Also, these findings are consistent with recent articles
which have shown the reluctance of police to proceed further with
rape accusations that will stand on the uncorroborated testimony of the
victim, even in jurisdictions without a corroboration requirement.12-
The answer to the second question-how do juries decide those rape
charges based on the unsupported testimony of the victim?-is also
suggested by Kalven and Zeisel's findings. As noted earlier, juries
overwhelmingly acquit men accused of rape in the absence of aggra-
vating circumstances. 12"° Those rape cases in which there is an absence
of aggravating circumstances are more likely to be those cases in which
corroboration is either minimal or absent entirely.12 To the extent
this is so, juries would seem less likely to convict a man on the basis
of a woman's ipse dixit claim of rape.12 S
Thus, the available empirical evidence suggests that the difficulty
of defending against an uncorroborated rape accusation, is far less than
the difficulty in prosecuting one successfully. The female victim of a
122. H. KALvEN & H. ZrIsEL, supra note 39, at 142.
123. Id. at 141.
124. The following jurisdictions which imposed substantial corroboration rcquire-
ments at the time of the study were represented in the 3576 trials as indicated:






If these jurisdictions were fairly represented in the seventy-two rape cases, then only
6.3 per cent (or approximately five) were tried in one of the six of them. Id. at 37-38.
125. See, e.g., Note, Police Discretion and the Judgment that a Crime Has Been
Committed-Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 282-89 (1968).
126. See p. 1379 supra.
127. Evidence of extrinsic violence, for example, would be corroborative of the ele-
ment of force. See note 25 supra. However, there still might be corroboration in such
forms as medical evidence of penetration or police testimony as to the prompt complaint
or hysteria of the victim. See p. 1369 supra.
128. See Younger, supra note 8, at 276.
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sexual assault who lacks evidence to corroborate her story is unlikely to
persuade the police and prosecuting attorney to prosecute her assailant.
And even if the man is prosecuted, the jury is extremely unlikely to
convict him of rape.
III. The Argument for Reform
The available evidence indicates that relatively few uncorroborated
rape accusations result in a trial, much less a conviction, even in the
absence of a formal corroboration requirement. The issue thus fo-
cuses on the disposition of those relatively few rape cases in which
the complainant's testimony is uncbrrbborated but a jury would still
convict if permitted to do so. Does the danger of false convictions in
these cases warrant the imposition of a corroboration rule? On bal-
ance, it does not. In a particular case the absence of corroboration may
call for an ad hoc judicial determination that there is insufficient
evidence upon which a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. But a prior legislative or judicial determination
that corroboration is mandatory in all rape cases is a blunderbuss ap-
proach. 12 9 It depends upon the assumption that eveiy uncorroborated
rape charge is sufficiently different from uncorroborated charges of
other crimes to warrant a distinctive rule of evidence.
A rape charge does have some distinctive characteristics. The penal-
ties upon conviction are inordinately severe. 130 The mere accusation,
even if the prosecution is unsuccessful, may damage a defendant's repu-
tation and livelihood far more deeply than would prosecution for
another crime. Yet, the gravity of the offense alone cannot justify the
requirement in view of the severity of penalty for other crimes for
which no corroboration is required.131 Neither the supposed distinc-
tiveness of rape as a crime, nor the explicit justifications for the cor-
roboration requirement, are sufficient reason for a categorical rule
of evidence precluding conviction on the unsupported testimony of
a complainant. The explicit justifications-the possibility of falsifica-
tion,'3 2 the emotion raised by the rape charge,133 and the difficulty
129. To quote Justice Frankfurter writing in another context, "Surely, this Is to
burn the house to roast the pig." Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
130. See p. 1381 supra.
131. In New York, for example, no corroboration is required for conviction of murder
or kidnapping in the first degree which are punishable by mandatory life imprisonment.
N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 125.25, 135.25, 70.00(2)(A) (McKinney 1967).
132. See pp. 1373-78 supra.
133. See pp. 1378-82 supra.
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of defending against the accusation' 34-are largely without merit. The
serious defects in the rule's rationale, coupled with its negative effect
upon successful prosecutions, 135 would seem to warrant repeal of the
requirement in any form.130
Repeal will not leave the innocent defendant without protection
against the false charges of a lying or deluded complainant. In large
part the goals and purposes of the corroboration requirement are
served by two ordinary safeguards in our criminal law-the jury trial
and the judge's power to set aside or direct a verdict based on insuf-
ficient evidence. 37
First, "Dj]uries are not ignorant; they look with suspicion on ipsc
dixit complaints of sexual misconauct . . ."38 Wignore argues that
"a rule of law requiring corroboration has probably little actual in-
fluence upon the jurors' minds over and above that ordinary caution
and suspicion which would naturally suggest itself for such charges
. 39Kalven and Zeisel's findings suggest that the "ordinary caution
and suspicion" of the jury is heightened in cases of non-aggravated
rape. 140 The jury trial thus remains a potent screen against the success
of any rape charge.' 41
Second, the purposes of the rule of corroboration are further served
by the judge's power to set aside or direct a verdict based on in-
substantial evidence.'412 Judges frequently set aside verdicts in juris-
dictions having no statutory rule upon the same kind of evidence
which would be insufficient under the corroboration rule in other
jurisdictions.' 43
The difference in effect between the substantial evidence rule and
a corroboration requirement varies with the content and interpretation
of the particular requirement. New York's earlier statutory corrob-
134. See pp. 1382-84 supra.
135. See note 38 supra.
136. For an argument in favor of complete repeal, sec Ludwig, supra note 2.
137. 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2061, at 354.
138. Younger, supra note 8, at 276.
139. 7 J. Wir.oRE, supra note 10, § 2061, at 354.
140. See p. 1379 supra.
141. The corroboration requirement operates, of course, as a means of taking some
cases away from the jury for fear that it will return an inappropriate verdict. Such
mistrust of the jury is inconsistent with recent Supreme Court decisions which hac
stressed the fundamental role of the jury in the American system of justice. See, e.g.,
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1968) which cited H. KALvEN & H. ZEsiL,
supra note 39, for the proposition that juries do understand the evidence and come
to sound conclusions in most cases; when they differ withil te judge, the reason is
usually that they are serving some of the very purposes for which the) were created.
142. 7 J. wVI soro, supra note 10, § 2061, at 354. See Ginter v. State, 189 Ind. 672,
677, 128 N.E. 834, 835 (1920).
143. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 239 So. 2d 284, 286 (Fla. App. 1970), rcv'd, 2419 So. 2d
16 (Fla. 1971).
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oration rule went far beyond the substantial evidence rule, making
rape convictions nearly unobtainable.144 However, corroboration rules
in Georgia and Iowa do not seem to have had a significant effect upon
the conviction rate. Nebraska's rule has had only a moderate effect. 1' 1
Hence, the number of guilty men "freed" by corroboration rules may
be large in some states yet small in others, varying with the form of
the corroboration rule imposed.
Conceding that the corroboration requirement permits some guilty
men to escape punishment where corroboration is unavailable, some
commentators have argued that this effect is consistent with one of
the main thrusts of Anglo-American criminal law-the protection of
the innocent.146 However, the balance between convicting the guilty
and safeguarding the rights of the innocent-a balance which our
criminal jurisprudence traditionally has struck in favor of protecting
the innocent147-seems to be set so far in favor of acquittal in rape
cases (even in the absence of a formal corroboration rule) that its
removal will still leave the innocent well protected.' 48
IV. Alternatives and Modifications to the Corroboration Rule
A. Alternatives
Legal commentators, courts, and legislatures have considered a num-
ber of measures designed to replace the corroboration requirement
and protect men from the danger of a conviction based on an un-
founded charge of rape. Perhaps the most common suggestion has
been that the complainant in a rape case be subjected to a mandatory
144. See note 38 supra. See, e.g., In re F., 327 N.Y.S.2d 237, 238, 243 (Fain. Ct., City
of N.Y. 1971), a juvenile proceeding in which the judge found that the attempted forcible
rape and forcible sodomy were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, yet dismissed the
charges because of the lack of technical corroboration of identification required by
statute. However, he found both defendants guilty of armed robbery of the same victim.
145. See note 38 supra.
146. See, e.g., M. PLoscowE, supra note 59, at 194.
147. See 4 W. BLACKSrONE, COMMENTARIES 358:
[F]or the law holds it better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent
party suffer.
148. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in the Criminal
Process, in CRIME, LAW & SociETY 173 (A. Goldstein & J. Goldstein eds. 1971). In effect,
the argument of this Note is that the nature of rape charges does not warrant givihg
the accused in such a case any "special advantage" not enjoyed by defendants charged
with other crimes. The corroboration requirement dramatically shifts the balance of
advantage in favor of the defendant and against the state in prosecution of rape charges,
The balance should be seen as one involving the accused and the state, not the accused
and the complainant.
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examination by a competent psychiatrist.149 Less common has been
the recommendation that a physical examination of the complainant
be compulsory in order to reveal fabricated accusations of rape.150
Other commentators have suggested that all complainants in rape
cases undergo a lie detector interrogation.151 The Model Penal Code
proposed that American courts follow the rule existing in England
and Canada whereby, in any prosecutions of a sex felony before a
jury, the jury is given a special instruction, cautioning it to evaluate
the testimony of the victim with special care in view of his or her
emotional involvement and the difficulty in determining the truth
with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private.1 52 The
Model Penal Code also proposed a requirement that, in order for a
prosecution for a sex offense to be instituted or maintained, notice
of the alleged illegal offense must be brought to the attention of the
police within three months after its occurrence153
All of these suggestions, however, are like the corroboration re-
quirement itself in depending on the premise that an accusation of
149. Wigmore is the leading proponent of a rule whereby no sex offense charge
could go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental makeup
has been examined and testified to by a qualified physician. A J. wssoa, supra note
64, § 924(b), at 736-47. Although, as Wigmore notes, such an examination is faorced b)'
most psychiatrists, it would have serious shortcomings. Note, Corroborating Charges of
Rape, supra note 8, at 1142-43, argues that a psychiatric examination would be a grave
invasion of the privacy of the complainant and, more importantly, that it is not the
function of psychiatry to distinguish truth from falsehood. See generally Juvilier,
Psychiatric Opinions as to the Credibility of Witnesses, 48 Q Fur. L. REv. 648, 675-76
(1960) for a discussion of the problems inherent in the use of psychiatric testimony
in a rape case. For the most exhaustive judicial consideration of Wigmore's proposal
see Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 171-77, 410 P.2d 838, 846.50, 49 Cal. Rptr.
302, 310-14 (1966).
150. Cf. Note, Corroboration Held Necessary to Prove Sexual Abuse in the Third
Degree Where the Underlying Act is Rape, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1025, 1032-33 (1969). But
such physical examinations are hardly foolproof.
It must be remembered that it is very easy for a woman-whether for spite or
revenge-to make a physician believe rape occurred.
Graves & Francisco, supra note 45, at 109.
151. See Williams, supra note 56, at 664. However, lie detectors may not be able
to detect the pathological liars. Floch, Limitations on the Lie Detector, 40 J. CRnIs. L. & C.
651, 652 (1950).
152. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 213.6(6) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). For the operation
of this rule in England and Canada, see Williams, supra note 56; Savage, Corroboration
in Sexual Offenses, 6 Cu.. L.Q. 282 (1964).
153. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Texas does not
require prompt complaint in order for a rape charge to be prosecuted, but in the
absence of such timely complaint, its courts require corroboration otherwise not de-
manded. See, e.g., Wright v. State, 364 S.W.2d 384, 387 (rex. Cr. App. 1963). Illinois
reaches a similar result by holding that evidence of a prompt complaint to third per-
sons is complete corroboration. See, e.g., People v. DeFrates, 595 IIl. 439, 444, 70 N.E.2d
591, 594 (1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 811 (1947).
The notion that the victim's failure to report the offense promptly reflects upon the
substance of the accusation can be traced back at least as far as Lord Hale: Failure of
the party ravished to make "fresh discovery and pursuit of the offcnse . . . carries [with
it] a presumption that her suit is but malicious and feigned .... 1 A. LE, sulpra
note 93, at 632.
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rape is so different from any other accusation as to warrant a categor-
ical rule of evidence rather than reliance on the discretion of the
trial judge and the common sense of the jury. As this Note has sug-
gested, the three major justifications for distinguishing between rapes
and other crimes (for evidentiary purposes) are strongly suspect;
consequently there seems little reason for trading one peculiar rule
for another.154 As with corroboration, in an individual case a judge
may find that the nature of the charge and the characteristics of the
complainant require that a psychiatric examination of her should
be directed before prosecution can proceed.1'r Or he may hold that
her failure to report the rape promptly to the police renders her
testimony insufficiently reliable to sustain a conviction. But rape cases
as a class do not warrant a hard-and-fast rule requiring psychiatric
examination of the complainant or prompt complaint or any other
uniquely applicable practice.
B. Child Complainants
Even if the corroboration requirement should be abolished in its
application to adult complainants, some have proposed that it be
retained in its application to charges of statutory rape.5 0 It has been
thought by many that the dangers of unfounded rape charges are par-
ticularly common and dangerous when made by children.";' This
contention has several elements. The mystery and fascination of sexual
activity, combined with children's greater imagination, makes them
more likely to fabricate an accusation of rape.l"S Also, a child's charge
154. Insofar as some alternatives to the corroboration rule have independent jtstifl-
cation, they may have greater validity. For example, the prompt complaint requirement,
see p. 1387 supra, rests on the premise that one who has been subjected to an act of
violence is unlikely to delay reporting the offense. To the extent that this prenise Is
accurate, the rule may be a sound one, although logically it should be extended to
require prompt complaint by victims of all physical assaults.
155. See Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 176, 410 P.2d 838, 819, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 302, 313 (1966), in which the court held that
discretion should repose in the trial judge to order a psychiatric examination of
the complaining witness in a case involving a sex violation if the defendant pre-
sents a compelling reason for such an examination.
Standards the court laid down for establishing whether or not a reason was compelling
were: (I) little or no evidence in support of the charge, and (2) indication that the
complainant's mental or emotional condition might affect her veracity.
156. For charges of statutory rape where lack of consent results from the victim's
age alone, New York's revised corroboration law has a separate provision requiring
corroboration of the identity of the assailant. Law of May 22, 1972, ch. 373, § 1, NX.
Sess. Law News, 195th Sess., June 10, 1972, at 811-12.
157. "Unfounded accusations of rape are particularly apt to come from young chil-
dren." M. PLoscowE, supra note 59, at 187.
158. It is well recognized that children are more highly suggestive than adults.
Sexual activity, with the aura of mystery that adults create about it, confuses and
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of rape is likely to incorporate the hostilities of both mother and
child;119 this process may be quite unintentional on the part of the
mother, 160 or it may be intentional, the mother using her child as a
tool for blackmail' 6 ' or revenge. 162 Finally, jurors are thought to be
particularly prone to believe and sympathize with an infant victim,10 3
just as they are considered predisposed to believe the claims of an
allegedly sexually attacked woman. 4 For these reasons, many juris-
dictions apply the corroboration requirement solely or with special
rigor when the complainant is a child,:03 though this reaction is by
no means universal. 60
Even if it be conceded that there is a greater danger of a child
fabricating a charge of rape and of a jury believing it, imposing a rule
of law that all such testimony be corroborated in order to sustain
a conviction is a crude response. 07 In most states, there are general
common law or statutory provisions dealing with the testimony of
children. If examination of the child reveals an insufficient capacity
fascinates them. Moreover, they have, of course, no real understanding of the
serious consequences of the charges they make.
M. GUTrMfACHR H. WAEIHOFEN, supra note 78, at 374. See 0. Monkmoller, Psychology
and Psychopathy of Testimony, in 3A J. VIGMoRE, supra note 64, § 924(a), at 743-44.
159. Orenstein, Examination of the Complaining ll'itness in a Criminal Court, 107
A.m. J. PSYCHLTRY 684 (1951).
160. There are cases in which a mother discovers that her little girl has a vaginal
discharge or bleeds from the vagina at an age when the first menstruation is not
yet expected. She may suspect a sexual assault on her child and interrogate the
little girl and by either frightening her or by awakening the child's pseudologia
phantasticia, start the child to romancing and confessing a sexual assault on her,
which story is without foundation.
A. H.RzoG, supra note 57, at 845. See also J. MAcDONALD, supra note 47, at 221.
161. See, e.g., Dunn v. State, 127 Tenn. 267, 281, 154 SAV. 969, 972 (1913).
162. See, e.g., People v. Inman, 315 Mich. 456, 470, 24 NAV.2d 176, 182 (19-16), in
which the court noted the hostility of the defendant's wife, the 3other of the com-
plainant, toward the defendant, although it did not upset the conviction.
163. [T]here is always a tendency in sexual cases for the proceedings to start with
a prejudice against the defendant, if the complainant is a girl of tender years,
whose appearance makes a strong appeal to the sympathy and protective feelings
of the jury.
Williams, supra note 56, at 663.
164. See p. 1378 supra.
165. See, e.g., State v. Artez, 286 Minn. 545, 546, 176 NAV.2d 81, 82 (1970); Allison v.
United States, 409 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
166. See, e.g., State v. Sailbold, 213 La. 415, 428, 34 So. 2d 909, 913 (1948), in which
the court said:
[I]t is rather difficult to conceive that a child of her age would concoct such a
disgusting tale for the purpose of injuring an elderly man.
Missouri seems to apply the corroboration requirement only to rape cases involving
mature female complainants. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 351 Mo. 804, 818, 17-1 S.W2d
337, 345 (1943).
In State v. Trujillo, 60 N.M. 277, 283.84, 291 P.2d 315, 319-20 (1955), te court
emphasized that corroboration of the testimony of an infant complainant should not
be required in charges of sexual misconduct since such testimony is frequently the only
evidence obtainable.
167. WVigmore argued that the rule of corroboration in its entirety is a "crude and
childish measure ...." 7 J. WiroRE, supra note 10, § 2061, at 354.
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to observe, remember and recount, he may be disqualified from testi-
fying,168 his unswom statement may be taken,100 or his testimony may
be admitted with a cautionary instruction to the jury.170 The specific
danger of a woman using her child's perjured testimony as a weapon
against a man is not unique to sex crimes' 71 and is detectable through
conventional police and defense investigations.'7 2 Also, evidence is
lacking that juries have a distinctive tendency to believe a child com-
plainant in sex crimes. 17 3 Furthermore, there are unique problems
encountered in attempting to corroborate a charge of statutory rape.
Since children "may not know to resist," there often is not corroborat-
ing evidence of the criminal act. 74 Also, corroborating a charge of
statutory rape may be especially difficult in courts reluctant to accept
mere opportunity to commit the crime as sufficient corroboration of
identity. 175
The problem of false testimony from a child complainant, like
that of false testimony from an adult, is best met by a thorough ex-
ploration of the witness's credibility-the ability to observe, to recol-
lect, to narrate, and to do so with veracity. 70 This process is certainly
more difficult than resort to a categorical rule, but it is, nonetheless,
a particularly appropriate means of dealing with the mix of truth
and fantasy that may comprise the testimony of a child.
V. Conclusion
Legislatively or judicially created rules requiring that the testimony
of a complainant must be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction
for rape should be abandoned. None of the justifications for treating
rape cases differently from other criminal charges stands on solid
168. See, e.g., State v. Segerberg, 131 Conn. 546, 547-48, 41 A.2d 101, 102 (1945).
169. See, e.g., N.Y. CrIM. PROC. LAW ANN. § 60.20(2) (McKinney 1967).
170. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF TilE LAW OF EVDENCr § 62, at 140-41 (1954).
171. Cf. Ludwig, supra note 2, at 383.
172. See generally J. MACDONALD, supra note 47, at 276-94 for discussion of the
criminal investigation of rape charges.
173. There seems to be no distinctive jury response to child complainants in sex
crimes. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 39, at 170.
174. Graves & Francisco, supra note 45, at 116. See also State v. Shults, 43 N.M. 71,
75-76, 85 P.2d 591, 594 (1938).
175. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 249 Iowa 1219, 1224-25, 91 N.W.2d 562, 564.66 (1958),
in which there was little doubt that a sexual assault had been committed and the
defendant admitted being with the complainant near the time the offense was com-i
mitted, yet the court refused to accept his opportunity to commit the crime as sufficient
corroboration of the identity of the accused and reversed the conviction. Other courts
have accepted opportunity as corroboration of identity. See, e.g., People v. Masse, 5
N.Y.2d 217, 219-22, 156 N.E,2d 452, 453-55, 182 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823-25 (1959), State v.
Fehr, 45 S.D. 634, 638-39, 189 N.W. 942, 944 (1922).
176. See Ludwig, supra note 2, at 383.
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empirical or theoretical footing. Replacing the corroboration require-
ment with an alternative rule-requiring psychiatric or physical ex-
amination of the complainant, for example, or a report of the alleged
rape to the police within a certain period of time-is equally unjusti-
fied in the absence of an independent reason for treating rape accu-
sations distinctively. Limiting the application of the corroboration
rule to rape charges involving child complainants, although arguably
more justified than a broad corroboration rule, is still less desirable
than a thorough evaluation of a particular child's credibility.
The absence of corroboration in an individual case-perhaps even
in most cases-may well call for a holding that there is insufficient
evidence upon which a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. But this is a decision properly made on an ad
hoc basis by the trial judge, weighing all the facts and inferences of
the evidence introduced in a particular case. The corroboration rule
may be based plausibly on the laudable purpose of protecting the
innocent against false accusations; but this is a purpose of criminal
procedure to be fulfilled in all cases. If the traditional safeguards are
not functioning properly to fulfill that purpose, the solution lies in
reform of criminal procedure as a whole, not in a special rule for cases
involving the crime of rape.
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